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参见Joseph J. Norton & Heba M. Shams, Privatization in Modern Bank Regulation, presented in Oxford University Symposium on Privatization and the Law (Wolfson学院主办，M. Litkosky博士负责组织，2002年6月举行).
参见Carl-Johan Lindgern et al., BANK SOUNDNESS AND MACREECONOMIC POLICY (1996). 近来学者们主张通过创设一种“新国际金融体制”（new international financial architecture）来解决上述问题。关于学者们的观点，参见J. B. Attanasio & J. J. Norton (eds.), THE NEW INTERNATIONAL FINANCIAL ARCHITECTURE (Sir Joseph Gold Memorial Series 2001); Symposium, Law-Based Nature of the NEW International Financial Infrastructure, 33 INT’L LAW. 847 (1999).
参见Douglas Arner et al, FINANCIAL CRISES IN THE 1990s (2002). 另参见Joseph J. Norton, The Modern Genre of Infrastructural Law Reform: The Legal and Practical Realities--The Case of Banking Reform in Thailand, 55 SMU L. REV. 235 (2002).
参见G. N. Olson, BANKS IN DISTRESS: LESSONS FROM THE AMERICAN EXPERIENCE OF THE 1980s (2000); Syposium, The S & L Crisis: Death and Transfiguration, Annual Survey Issue on Financial Institutions and Regulations, 39 FORDHAM L. REV. S1 (1991); L. William Seidman, FULL FAITH AND CREDIT: THE GREAT S & L DEBACLE AND OTHER WASHINGTON SAGAS (1993)(作者系美国联邦存款保险公司前主席，该书是关于储蓄信贷机构和银行业危机的回忆录).
Marc R. Saidenberg & Philip E. Strahen, Are Banks Still Important for Financing Large Business?, 载于Federal Reserve Bank of New York, CURRENT ISSUES IN ECONOMICS AND FINANCE, vol. 5, no. 12 (Aug. 1999).
参见Laurence H. Meyer, Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System, Market Discipline as a Complement to Bank Supervision and Regulation, Statement at the Conference on Reforming Bank Capital Standards (June 14, 1999).
Joseph Norton & Christopher Olive, Regulation of the Securities Activities of Banks: A Comparison of U.S. Deregulation and Japanese Liberalization, 载于 INVESTMENT BANKING: THEORY AND PRACTICE (Edward P. M. Gardener & Philip Molyneux eds. 2d ed., 1996).
Susan M. Phillips & Man N. Rechtschaffen, International Banking Activities: The Role of the Federal Reserve in Domestic Capital Markets, 21 FORDHAM INT’L L. J. 1754, 1760 (1998).
Comptroller of the Currency, Advisory Letter No. 99-4, Leveraged Lending (May 3, 1999)(分析了贷款规则的缺陷).
参见Robert C. Effros (ed.), CURRENT LEGAL ISSUES AFFECTING CENTRAL BANKS, vol. 5 (1998).
Phillips & Rechtschaffen, supra note 17, at 1765-66.
参见Lisa M. DeFerrari & David E. Palmer(他们是联邦储备体系理事会银行监管部的成员), Supervision of Large Complex Banking Organizations, Fed. Res. Bull. 87 (Feb. 2001).
在国际清算银行（BIS）的网站上，有一个关于巴塞尔委员会的衔接。该衔接的内容十分丰富，不仅包括巴塞尔委员会的文件“汇编”（compendium），还包括各种出版物、联合发布的文件、公告和工作报告等。参见http://www.bis.org/publ.htm。
Federal Reserve Board, SR 97-24, Risk-Focused Framework for Supervision of Large Complex Institutions (Oct. 27, 1997) and related SR 99-15 and 99-18 (1999); 以及Joint Forum on Financial Conglomerates, Supervision of Financial Conglomerates, Basel Committee Publications No. 47 (Feb. 1999)(系巴塞尔委员发布的关于金融混业集团监管指南的征求意见稿)，来自 http://www.bis.org/publ/bcbs34.htm. 另参见Professor Howell E. Jackson & Cameron Half, Background Paper on Evolving Trends in the Supervision of Financial Conglomerates (Harvard Law School, June 2002)(系论文初稿)(原文存于本文作者处).
交易测试是指监管当局对商业银行业务的合规性和经营成果实施的日常监督检查。风险监管则是监管当局帮助、指导和监督商业银行建立、实施和完善风险管理和内部控制体系，并对商业银行的业务过程和风险状况作出全面的评价。通常，风险监管是交易测试的前提和基础，商业银行风险管理和内部控制体系的评价结果可以为银行监管当局确定交易测试的性质、频率、范围和内容提供重要的依据。因此，现代银行监管在关注商业银行风险管理和内部控制体系的同时，并不排斥交易测试的应用，而是强调事前的风险监管能够使交易测试的针对性更强，从而有助于确保和提高监管效率。此外，风险监管理念的确立也表明，现代银行监管方法与外部独立审计技术已经极大地趋同，银行监管当局可以更充分地了解和利用外部审计师的工作成果。——译者注。
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