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初始状态包含了博弈者的试探性行为(experimentation)。
如果百分之八十以上的博弈者最初选择C，收敛到（C，C）；反之，如有百分之二十以上的博弈者最初选择M，收敛到（M，M）。
Milgrom & Stokey (1982)的“无投机(no-speculation)”定理在精神上类似。
从打赌的刺激中得到的效用不在我们考虑之列，虽然这点在现实中的许多打赌或赌博问题中可能更重要。
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