托马斯·阿奎那的自愿行为理论
Thomas Aquinas’ Theory of Voluntary Action
张继选
【摘要】道德科学是关于人的行为的实践科学。人的行为是人在理性和意志支配下所完成的行为，意志的对象是欲求目的，理性的对象是鉴别善的真理，特别就意志而言，托马斯认为它所欲求的目的有自然的目的和超自然的目的，根据这一区别，托马斯的道德科学可以明显地区分为基于理性的道德哲学和基于信仰的道德神学，并且在最根本的意义上，前者是以后者为归向。尽管如此，托马斯的道德哲学依然具有相对的独立性。本文目的是要从道德哲学的维度探讨托马斯的自愿行为理论。在托马斯看来，自愿行为即是道德行为，这意味着行为的道德特性是以行为者的意志的自愿性为前提，道德归责预设意志自愿。为了确定行为的自愿性的性质和根源，本文首先阐述了托马斯关于人的行为与属于人的行为之间的著名区分，这种区分表明，人的行为的自愿性是基于人的意志和理性对人的行为的支配即基于发源于行为者的内在原则。其次，既然自愿性根植于内在原则，那幺，与此相反，基于外在原则即强制和无知的行为则是非自愿的。然而，并非一切形式的强制和无知都毫无例外地产生非自愿的行为，本文也分析了强制和无知与意志的两重活动之间的复杂关联关系，并着重指出托马斯关于意志活动的双重规定，特别是他认为肇发性是意志的内在本质规定，这是托马斯对西方伦理学上的自由意志理论的最原创性贡献。
Moral science is a practical science that concerns human action—a kind of action which a human being performs at the mercy of both of the human faculties: will and reason. Human will is directed at the end, for the sake of which action is done, and human reason is directed at the truth of what is good. Thomas holds that the end, for which will desires, can fall into the natural and the supernatural end. According to this division, Thomas’s moral science correspondingly is broken up into a based-reason moral philosophy and a based-belief moral theology, with the former eventually and necessarily leading to the latter at the fundamental level. Nonetheless, Thomas’s moral philosophy is still able to hold its own up to a relative point. The aim of the present paper is to provide an account of Thomas’ theory of voluntary action from the standpoint of moral philosophy. In Thomas’ view, voluntary action is equivalent to moral action. This implies that moral status of action presupposes the voluntary grounded in willing. This is to say that moral imputation involves the voluntary. This paper first brings out Thomas’ famous distinction between actions humanae and actiones hominis with a view to ascertaining the nature and source of the voluntary. This distinction shows that actions humanae are based on the internal principle involving reason and will. Since the voluntary is grounded in the internal principle, those actions are, on the contrary, involuntary that are brought on by forced constraint and ignorance as external principles. However, not all such principles can bring about, without exceptions, actions that are involuntary. The paper finally also analyzes the complicated relations of force and ignorance to the two-fold activity of will. And perhaps it is worthy to emphasize that the difference between the elicited act and the commanded act of a will, which Thomas made, and his claim that the former act is the essential determination of the will, are a piece of the most original contribution made by him to the theory of free will in Western ethics.
【全文】
托马斯·阿奎那（Thomas Aquinas）的行为理论是他的道德哲学的出发点。正如著名的托马斯哲学专家拉尔夫·麦金纳尼（Ralph McInerny , 1929年—）所说：“不管道德哲学在性质上是哲学的，还是神学的，对托马斯来说，它来源于对行为者所完成的行为的反思。”[i]作为道德哲学的出发点的人的行为的根本性质在于，人的行为（actiones humanae）是属于人的实践理性活动，是人为了实现一定的目的而在（实践）理性指导下所完成的一种活动，因为托马斯认为，“人的行为的规则和尺度是理性”（Regula autem et mensura humanorum actuum est ratio.）。[ii] 从这种意义上说，人的行为就是理性的行为。
