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结语
作为研究者的我们与我们的研究对象之间的博弈，可以看作是人类处境的恰当写照。作为博弈者的我们，永远不能摆脱两个基本的限制。一是博弈者的知识的局限性，二是包括博弈者在内的环境即博弈对象的复杂性。二者之间存在着从元理论的角度看永远不能超越的界限。因为，我们实际上是把长期多次的、动态的问题转化成一次性（虽然可能是多阶段）、静态问题 ，把变化着的事物还原为假设不变也就不可再分析的“原子”之间的结构。在这个理论不断回归也不断精致化的过程中，即便能在自己构建的封闭的模型里一览无余，我们依然离外部开放世界无穷复杂的可能性非常遥远。但这就是生活。
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