Turning back to the prior notice, even Article 25 of the 1982 Convention is not persuasive or at least not capable of such inference, although the right of transit passage statutorily cannot be barred. The Korean scholars try to justify this requirement in two ways. One is to distinguish the prior notice from the prior authorization regime. But they seem lack of demonstrability besides the denial expression.(1) And this is not the vital argumentation. The key point is on the grounds of Korean security, “as the 1953 Armistice Agreement that the United Nations forces concluded with both North Korea and the People’s Republic of China (PRC) does not formally terminate the state of war in the Korean peninsula”(2). Logically, it’s understandable for Korea to adopt such a requirement. In my opinion, the Korean War has ended fifty years before, even without any testimony of international law, but still, the practical fact that some countries do not require prior notice or authorization does not mean that a state would not be entitled to require such notification or authorization if it deemed it necessary to this requirement as precautionary measures. It should be considered as part of maritime international law. That’s why Professor Brownlie said, it’s clear that a significant number, and perhaps a majority, of states require prior authorization (or prior notice---author) for the passage of warships, and as a consequence, dogmatic assertions of a right of passage have an aspect of advocacy.(3) I agree with him.
　　Other Practices
　　Furthermore, there are contending interests---fishing, shipping, exploration, security, and freedoms of navigation----in use of the Korea Strait between the various countries that most use the Strait (the Koreas, Japan, Russia, China, and the United States). These interests tend to interfere with each other. One method for reconciling some of the conflicts between shipping and other interests is with a maritime traffic control (MTC) scheme. There has currently no very active MTC scheme in the Strait until 1997. MTC schemes include active Vessel Traffic Service (VTS) systems and passive Traffic Separation Systems (TSS). A VTS system does not seem appropriate for the Korea Strait at this time because of its cost and complexity. However, a TSS would be appropriate. A TSS could possibly alleviate potential conflicts of interest in the Strait. It could increase transparency even while regional navies grow; it could dampen the possibility of low level threats such as piracy; and it could enhance confidence- building in the region. In addition, a TSS in the Korea Strait may prevent serious environmental accident from a catastrophic oil spill. Economic growth in Northeast Asia is expected to continue in the foreseeable future, and tanker traffic is expected to increase along with it. Surviving the Financial Crisis in 1997, the energy needs of the Korea still increased and expanding harbor facilities are not keeping up with demand. Yasu and Ulsan harbors are apparently bulging. Russian and Chinese use of the Strait has somewhat increased, although not significantly, but this may change. Although there have not been any major oil pollution incidents as a result of the interaction between transiting tankers and the fishing fleets, it may be only a matter of time before such an event occurs. It makes sense for the governments whose interests are affected by activities in the Strait to engage in a cooperative dialogue on devising a TSS for the Strait, and to earmark funds that would otherwise be expended on cleaning up future oil spills on furthering this cooperative effort. As a result, until now in 2004, Korean government has authorized 14 items of traffic separation schemes, infra:

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