4.仲裁费用的分摊问题
最后,反对合并仲裁的理由是仲裁成本费用的分摊是否恰当合适的问题。一些规则规定每一方承担自己的仲裁费用,然而其他的规则规定败诉方应当支付所有费用或者在双方之间分摊费用。由于没有一个普遍适用的公式,仲裁费用公平分摊仍然是仲裁庭在考虑每一案件特殊情况下后所拥有的自由裁量权。
总而言之,有些人认为,仲裁实践表明这种不一致裁决的风险很小。虽然具有具体化的机会,但是其不会成为一个重大问题,所以,不一致裁决风险被过度强调了。但是,其他人则认为,由于仲裁可能会产生不公正公平的结果,所以不一致或矛盾裁决的风险将会或多或少地分散或减少国际社会对于仲裁作为一种有效争端解决方式的信心,特别是在涉及公共利益问题时。
结论
确保仲裁裁决的一致性和可预测性,并在此基础上创造对投资仲裁体制的信心,是任何以规则为中心体制的核心价值。但是在国际投资法领域,这种价值正在受到侵蚀。[36]为此,需要利用国际投资协定相关条款预防投资仲裁平行程序的出现,避免因此带来的不一致裁决后果。我们在一定程度上可以认为,国际投资协定中的相关条款可以预防投资仲裁平行程序问题,首先,这些条款本质上要求投资者在多重救济之间做出一个不可反转的选择,从而事实上预防平行程序的出现。其次,相关国际投资协定还规定明确的程序合并条款,其可以将源于同一国家措施且基于同一事实和法律因素的申请合并仲裁,可以预防不一致或冲突裁决的风险。再次,在ICSID公约体制下,已经发展出“事实合并仲裁”程序,其同样可以预防投资仲裁平行程序的出现。
【作者简介】
朱明新,单位为厦门大学法学院。
【注释】比如法官施韦贝尔认为,国际投资仲裁庭是20世纪国际程序法的最大成就之一。See Stephen M. Schwebel, Justice in International Law, Cambridge University Press, 2011,pp. 152-160.
August Reinisch, “The Future of Investment Arbitration”,in Christina Binder, Uresula Kriebaum, August Remisch and Stephan Withtich(eds.),International Investment Law for the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer, Oxford University Press, 2009,pp. 908-916.
Katia Yannaca-Small, “Parallel Proceedings”,in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer(eds.),The Ox-ford Handbook of International Investment Law, Oxford University Press. 2008.p.1025.
这里的国际投资协定主要包括三种类型,分别是双边投资条约(BITs)、含有投资章节的区域贸易协定(主要指NAF-TA)以及多边投资保护条约(主要指ECT)。在这三类条约中,双边投资条约占据主导地位。
Andrew Newcombe and Lluis Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment, Kluwer law international,2009, p. 46.
Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger, International Investment Arbitration: Substantive Principles, Oxford University Press, 2007, p. 87.
CF Amerasinghe, Local Remedies in International Law, 2nd ed,Cambridge University Press, 2004,pp. 269-276.
通说认为,国际投资仲裁制度是以国际商事仲裁制度为蓝本的。但是晚近学者认为,国际投资仲裁已经超越了国际商事仲裁的私法属性,从而进入公法领域。See Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law, Oxford University Press,2007.pp. 45-71.
Banro v. Congo, Award on Jurisdiction of 1September 2000,ICSID Case No. ARB/98/7,para. 25.
See Dohyun Kim, “The Annulment Committee’ s Role in Multiplying Inconsistency in ICSID Arbitration: The Need to Move Away From An Annulment-Based System”,86 NYU Law Review 242 (2011),pp. 242-279.
August Reinisch, “The Issues Raised by Parallel Proceedings and Possible Solutions”,in Michael Waibel, Asha Ksushal, Kyo-Hwa Liz Chung and Claire Balchin (eds.),The Backlash Against Investment Arbitration: Perceptions and Reality, Kluwer Law Internation-al. 2010. p. 115
Norbert Horn, “Arbitration and the Protection of Foreign Investment: Concepts and Means”,in Norbert Horn and Stefan KroIl(eds.),Arbitrating Foreign Investment Disputes, Kluwer Law International, 2004, pp. 1-2.
Christoph Schreuer, “Introduction: Interrelationship of Standards”,in August Reinisch(ed.),Standards of Investment Protec-tion, Oxford University Press, 2009, pp. I-2.
关于“相对待遇”与“绝对待遇”的划分与内容,请参阅:Todd J Grierson-Weiler and Ian A Laird, “Standard of Treat-ment”,in Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino and Christoph Schreuer(eds.),The Oxford Handbook of International Investment Law, Ox-ford University Press, 2008,pp. 261-264.
Christoph Schreuer, “Calvo’ s Grandchildren: The Return of Local Remedies in Investment Arbitration”,4 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 1 (2005).no.1-17.
相关研究表明目前仅有危地马拉依据该条做出了保留。See Katia Yannaca - Small, supra note , p. 1026.
See Chile Model BIT, in UNCTAD, International Investment Instrument Compendium, Vol III, United Nations Publication, 1996,p.143.
Peter Turner, “The‘Fork in the Road’ Revisited”,in F Ortino, A Sheppard and H Warner(eds.),Investment Treaty Law,Current Issues, Vol 1, British Institute of International and Comparative Law, 2006,pp. 177-182.
Katia Yannaca-Small, supra note ,p. 1027.
Waste Management Inc v. Mexcio (I),Award of 2 June 2000, ICSID Case No. ARB (AF)/98/2, para. 27.
Waste Management Inc v. Mexcio(11),Decision on Mexico''s Preliminary Objection concerning the Previous Proceedings of 26 June 2002,ICSID Case No. ARB (AF) /00/3,para. 29.
Campbell McLachlan, Laurence Shore and Matthew Weiniger, supra note ,p. 292.
徐崇利:《“保护伞条款”的适用范围之争与我国的对策》,《华东政法大学学报》2008第4期,第49页。
See K Yannaca-Small, “Consolidation of Claims: A Promising Avenue for Investment Arbitration?” in OECD, International In-vestment Perspectives 2006, OECD Publishing, 2006, pp. 225-249.
Katia Yannaca-Small, supra note ,p.1033.
例如美国-智利FTA第10. 24条,美国-摩洛哥ETA第10. 24条,美国-中美洲-多米尼加FTA第10. 25条,加拿大-智利FTA第G-27条等。
桑普拉(Sempra)案源于美国-阿根廷BIT;相反,Camuzzi案源于比利时卢森堡经济联盟-阿根廷BIT。
See J Chin, “Consolidation of Arbitral Proceeding and International Arbitration”,7 (2) J. Intl. Arb. 53(1990),pp.53 et seq.
Canfor Corp v. United States of American, Terminal Forest Products Ltd v. United States of American and Tembc Inc et al v. Unit-ed States of American. Order of the Consolidation Tribunal in the Softwood Lumber Cases, 7 September 2005,para. 131.
D Hascher, “Consolidation of Arbitration by American Courts: Fostering or Hampering International Commercial Arbitration?”,1 J. INTL ARB. 127(1984),pp. 133-134.
Katia Yannaca-Small, supra note,p. 1042
Henri Alvarevz, “Arbitration under the North American Free Trade Agreement”,16. ARB. INTL 393 (2000),p. 414.
Corn Products International Inc v. United Mexican Stares and Archer Daniels Midland Company and Tate&Lyle Ingredients Amer-icas inc v. United Mexican Stares(HFCS),Order of the Consolidation Tribunal, 20 May 2005,para. 12.
F Gaillard, “Consolidation of Arbitral Proceedings and Court Proceedings, in Complex Arbitration: Perspective on their Procedural Implications”.Special Supplement, ICC International Court of Arbitration Bulletin, December 2003,pp. 35-42.
D Hascher, supra note ,p. 135
也有学者认为,投资仲裁体制非完善性的特点正是该体制吸引该体制使用者的优势。See Frank Spoorenberg and Jorge E.Vifluales, “Conflicting Decisions in International Arbitration”,8 The Law and Practice of International Courts and Tribunals 91 (2009),pp. 91-113.