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严格来说，监管竞争论较早出现于20世纪90年代初期，只是当时还未引起大规模的争论。
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“看不见的手”这一短语，在亚当·斯密的《道德情操论》和《国富论》当中各出现一次。亚当·斯密首先在《道德情操论》当中写到由于富人贪得无厌的欲望，雇佣千百人来为自己劳动，“但是他们还是同穷人一样分享他们所做一切改良的成果。一只看不见的手引导他们对生活必需品作出几乎同土地在平均分配给全体居民的情况下所能作出的一样的分配，从而不知不觉地增进了社会利益，并为不断增多的人口提供生活资料”。《国富论》当中，亚当·斯密又说：“他所考虑的不是社会的利益，而是他自身的利益，但他对自身利益的研究自然会或者毋宁说必然会引导他选定最有利于社会的用途”，“在这场合，象在其他许多场合一样，它受着一只看不见的手的指导，去尽力达到一个并非他本意想要达到的目的”。《道德情操论》当中的论述表明，“看不见的手”平衡了富人与穷人之间的利益关系，具有伦理的特性，反映了自然秩序包含道德秩序的思想；《国富论》当中的论述表明，“看不见的手”调节了个人和社会、私利和公利之间的关系，具有经济的职能，描绘了完全性市场的理想状况。后来的学者一般认为“看不见的手”的主要功能是通过市场提供了一个由私利追求通达公利最大化的路径。古典经济学家认为，“完全竞争”造成了一个完善的市场。亚当. 斯密的“看不见的手”，实际上就起了“完全竞争”在完善市场中的作用，他强调在一个完全竞争的自由市场里，市场中各方力量会自行调节，自行运转，无须任何外力（如政府）加以干预以自动地达到一个理想的均衡。
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