美国反垄断刑事政策及其对我国反垄断立法的启示-法搜-中国法律信息搜索网

【注释】Scott D.Hammond.From Hollywood to HongKong——Criminal Antitrust Enforcement is Coming to a City Near You.14Loy.Consumer L.Rev.567(2002).
1890 年《谢尔曼法》所规定的最高罚金为5000 美元,最高监禁期限为1 年;1955 年,最高罚金提高到5 万美元;1974 年,对个人的最高罚金提高到10 万美元,对公司的最高罚金提高到100 万美元,同时把最高监禁期限提升到3 年;1990 年,对个人的最高罚金提高到35 万美元,对公司的最高罚金提升到1000 万美元.
18U.S.C.3571(d).
“受违法行为影响的商业量”是判决指南中的核心概念,直接决定公司、个人的刑事罚金数额及个人的监禁期限.在司法实践中,不同法院对该术语有不同的理解,有些法院认为,受影响的商业包括违法行为存续期间的所有市场销售,另一些法院认为只包括合谋成功期间受影响的商业.目前较为公认的计算方法是牛曼(Newman) 法官提出的方法,即违法行为持续期间在合谋范围内所影响的全部商业,除非被告能提出反证.关于此问题的详细论述,请参看:Anne Marie Herron. The Antit rust Sentencing Guideline : Deterring Crime By Clarif2ying t he Volume of Commerce Muddle. 51 Emory L. J . 929. Spring , 2002.
犯罪点数是对公司规模、犯罪历史、自首等加重或减轻因素的量化,垄断罪的基本犯罪点数为5 点.更多的合作.修订后的宽免政策有三个重要特征:第一,如果没有事先调查,宽免就是自动的.换言之,如果在反垄断局没有进行调查之前,公司就提出报告并满足了该政策的要求,就肯定能获得宽免,不会遭到起诉.
ScottD.Hammond.Detecting and Deterring Cartel Activity through an Effective Leniency Program . November21-22，2000.http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/9928.htm.
Scott D.Hammond.An Overview of Recent Development in the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program.January10，2005.http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/207226.htm.
DonaldI.Baker.Pyrrhic Victories? Reexamining the Effectiveness of Antitrust Remedies in Restoring Competition and Deterring Misconduct:The Use of Criminal Law Remedies to Deterand Punish Cartels and Bid-Rigging.69Geo.Wash.L.Rev.693，2001.
GrayR.Spratling.theTrend towards Higher Corporate Fines:It’s a Whole New Ball Game.，March7，1997.http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/4011.htm.
Scott D.Hammond.An Overview of Recent Development in the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program.January10，2005.http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/207226.htm.
Scott D.Hammond.An Overview of Recent Development in the Antitrust Division’s Criminal Enforcement Program.January10，2005.http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/207226.htm.
Scott D.Hammond.Connerstone of an Effective Leniency Program.November22-23，2004.http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/speeches/206611.htm.
David Henry.Leniency Programs:An Anaemic Carrot for Cartels in France Germany and the UK.E.C.L.R2005，26(1)，13-23.
Dorit Mc Cann.Ireland’s New Competition Act2002.I.C.C.L.R.2002，13(11)，423-426.
Kristina Nord lander.Discovering Discovery-USDiscovery of ECLeniency Statements.E.C.L.R.2004，25(10)，646-659.
Sir Jeremy Lever Q.C.；John Pike.Cartel Agreements，Criminal Conspiracy and the Statutory"CartelOf2fence"---Part1， E.C.L.R.，Issue2，3.
罗昌发.贸易与竞争之法律互动 .中国政法大学出版社，2003，88-93.
Julian Joshua；Christopher Harding.Breaking up the Hard Core:the Prospects for the Proposed Cartel Offence.Crim.L.R.2002(12).
Sir Jeremy Lever Q.C.；John Pike.Cartel Agreements，Criminal Conspiracy and the Statutory"CartelOf2fence"---Part1， E.C.L.R.，Issue2，3.
Sir Jeremy Lever Q.C.；John Pike.Cartel Agreements，Criminal Conspiracy and the Statutory"CartelOf2fence"---Part1， E.C.L.R.，Issue2，3.
Sir Jeremy Lever Q.C.；John Pike.Cartel Agreements，Criminal Conspiracy and the Statutory"CartelOf2fence"---Part1， E.C.L.R.，Issue2，3.
Mark Furze；Susan Nash.Partnersin Crime-the Cartel Offence in UKLaw.I.C..C.L.R.2004，15(5)，138-153.
Mark Furze；Susan Nash.Partnersin Crime-the Cartel Offence in UKLaw.I.C..C.L.R.2004，15(5)，138-153.
David Henry.Leniency Programs:An Anaemic Carrot for Cartels in France Germany and the UK.E.C.L.R2005，26(1)，13-23.
郑鹏程.垄断罪的依据、构成与刑事责任 .河北法学，2003(2).
李国海.论反垄断法中的慎刑原则———兼论我国反垄断立法的非刑事化 .法商研究，2006(1).
Stephen Calkins.Corporate Compliance and the Antitrust Agencies’Bi-modal Penaltise.60 Law & Contemp.Prob.127.1997.
Stephen Calkins，An Enforcement Official’s Reflections in Antitrust Class Actions，39Ariz.L.Rev.413，437-44(1997)；A.Mitchell Polinsky & Steven Shavell，Should Employees Be Subject of Finesand Imprisonment Given the Existence of Cor2 porate Liability?13Int’lRev.L.&Econ，239(1993).
Transcript of Test imony of ScottD.Hammond before the United States Sentencing Commission Concerning Proposed 2005 Amendmentsto§2R1.1.April12，2005.http://www.usdoj.gov/atr/public/testimony/209071.htm.