该条款属于
宪法第三篇“基本权利”，它规定：国家不得制定任何法律剥夺或者侵削本篇给予之法律；任何与本款抵触之法律，在其抵触之范围内为无效。
按照印度
宪法第
368条的规定，对于涉及
宪法第六篇第五章（关于邦高等法院的规定）条文的修改，应当由半数以上的邦议会批准。
See S.P.Sathe, Constitutional Amendments 1950-1988: Law and Politics, N. M. Tripathivate Limited, 1989, p16.
See Sunder Paman, Constitution: The Basic Structure, in Political System in India, Vol 2, Edited by Verinder Grover, Deep & Deep Publications, 1989,p 12.
See supra note17, p16.
参见林良光主编：《印度政治制度研究》，北京大学出版社1995年版，页123。
See supra note 7, p 299.
See C.V.Keshavamurthy,Amending Power under the Indian Constitution----Basic Structure Limitations, Deep & Deep Publications, D-1/24,1982, p 55.
See supra note 18, p 13.
See supra note17, p 17.
同前注20引书，第125页。
See Sunder Paman, Parliament’s Power to Amend the Constitution: A Critique, in Political System in India, Vol 2, Edited by Verinder Grover, Deep & Deep Publications, 1989,p 586.
See Dalip Singh, Significance of Fundamental Rights and the Amending Power, in Political System in India, Vol 2, Edited by Verinder Grover, Deep & Deep Publications, 1989,p 314.
See supra note 18,p 17.
See supra note10, p 82.
See N.A. Palkhivala, Our Constitution—Defaced and Defiled, cited from Sunder Paman, supra note 18,p 18.
See supra note 17, p90.
See Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, 2nd ed. p. 2692.
See Upendra Baxi, Some Reflections on the Nature of Constituent Power, in Jacob,Dhavan(ed), Indian Constitution, Trends and Issues, p122 (1978).cited from S.P.Sathe, p71.
1971年国大党在人民院选举中获得了超过三分之二的多数，在1972年的邦议会选举中，国大党在全国18各邦中控制了14各邦议会三分之二以上的议席。同前引注20引书，页64。
关于对这一时期印度国内政治形势的介绍，参见迪利普×希罗：《今日印度内幕》，裴匡丽 戴可景译，天津人民出版社1980年版，页330以下。
同上，页341。
See Upendra Baxi, The Indian Supreme Court and Politics, Eastern Book Company, 1980, p 46.
See Seervai, Constitutional Law of India, 1st ed. p. 1117. cited from Seervai, supra note 32. p 2636.
See supra note 29 p 77.
See supra note 17, p 70.
id, p95.
id, p 73.
See supra note 29, p 78.
See Anirudh Prasad, A Critique of the Principle of Parliamentary Supremacy: A Study in Indian Constitutional Perspective, in Political System in India, Vol 2, Edited by Verinder Grover, Deep & Deep Publications, 1989,p 395.
See G.P.Verma, The Philosophical Foundation of the Adaptability of the Constitution----A Judicial Approach, in Political System in India, Vol 2, Edited by Verinder Grover, Deep & Deep Publications, 1989,p 61.
id, p 62.
See supra note 44,p 395.
M. Hidayatullah ,Constitutional Law of India, Vol 2, Bar Council of India Trust ,1984, p738.
See supra note 26,p 590.
See supra note 17, p90.
See D.Conrao, Constituent Power, Amendment and Basic Structure of the Constitution: A Critical Reconsideration, in Political System in India, Vol 9, Edited by Verinder Grover, Deep & Deep Publications, 1989,p 445.
参见张嘉尹：《论“价值秩序”作为宪法学的基本概念》，台大法学论丛第30卷第5期，页10，2001年。
See Willian L.Marbury, The Limitations upon the Amending Power, 33 Harv. L. Rev 223, 225 (1919).
See Laurence H. Tribe, A Constitution We Are Amending: In Defense of a Restrained Judicial Role, 97 Harv. L. Rev 433.436 (1983).
See Fedinand F.Fernadez, The Constitutionality of the Fourteenth Amendment, 39 S. Cal. L. Rev 378, 379 (1965).
See United States v.Gugel, 119 F.Supp.897.; Negrich v.Hohn,246F.Supp.173.(W.D.Pa.1965); Maryland Petition Comm v. Johnson, 265F. Supp,823(D.Md.1967); Heintz v. Board of Educ., 213 Md.340,131 A.2d 869(1957)
See Thomas Kilby Smith, The Rise of Federal Judicial Supremacy in the United States,46 Am. L. Reg. 621, 628 (1898).
See Brannon P.Denning & John R.Vile, The Relevance of Constitutional Amendment: A Response to David Strauss, 77 Tul. L. Rev. 247, 276 (2002).
按照亨廷顿的看法，20世纪30年代的美国最高法院的法官们，因急于扩大自己的直接影响力，而损害了最高法院这一制度的长远利益。参见亨廷顿：《变革社会中的政治秩序》，李盛平 杨玉生等译，华夏出版社1988年版，页26。
307U.S.433(1939).
307U.S.433,459(1939).
See P.Kodanda Rao, Supremacy: Parliament or Supreme Court, in Political System in India, Vol 9, Edited by Verinder Grover, Deep & Deep Publications, 1989,p 73.分析法学大师哈特曾经对此案件做过精辟的阐述，参见哈特：《法律的概念》，张文显等译，中国大百科全书出版社1996年版，页122。
