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See, Mark Armstrong and David E. M. Sappington, Regulation, Competition and Liberalisation, 2005, http://www.econ.ucl.ac.uk/downloads/armstrong/reg2.pdf.
Supra, note 18.
Supra, note 18.
Supra, note 18.
Supra, note 18.
According to the contribution of US scholars, it is very difficult to enter the US postal market: an entrant that has a cost advantage of 50% and that delivers only one day a week would still need 15% market share in order to reach cost parity with the US Postal Service. An entrant that delivers two days a week would need 19% market share if it had a 50% cost advantage, and 23% if it had a 33% cost advantage. See details in Paul W.J. de Bijl, Eric van Damme, and Pierre Larouche, Regulating Access to Stimulate Competition in Postal Markets?, http:// www.tilburguniversity.nl/tilec/ publications/publisheduk/postal.pdf.
Supra, note 18.
See, Joshua S. Gans, Regulating Private Infrastructure Investment: Optimal Price for Access to Essential Facilities, Journal of Regulatory Economics, 20:2 167-189, 2001.
See, Pierre Larouche, A Close Look at Some Assumptions Underlying EC Regulation of Electronic Communications, Journal of Network Industries 3: 129-149, 2002.
This assumption has not yet been cast doubt on and this project supports it as well.
This assumption is arguable from the applicant’s view. The applicant believes that it is always necessary for telecommunications network providers to get a large quantity of customer basis unless an extraordinary technological innovation greatly decreases the cost of construction of a network; otherwise, it would be unprofitable to build and operate the network.Such customer basis definitely excludes competition on the relevant market; otherwise, it must lead to efficiency. If this customer basis is equal to or more than the market demand, single network would be most efficient; if this customer basis is less than the market demand, then oligo-networks could come out and produce oligopoly competition and never effective competition. Under both cases, regulation to a certain extent is necessary. Accordingly, the applicant does not believe competition law would remove regulation out of the telecommunications market. Nevertheless, the doubt on the assumption will be kept untouched because now the applicant does not have firm arguments to prove his viewpoint. This issue will be studied afterwards.
See, Framework Directive, Chapter IV.
Supra, note 6.
This point herein is contrary to the opinion of Prof. Pierre Larouche. In one of his papers, he alleged that competition law would be more flexible and evaluative, whereas sector-specific regulation would be more static and rigid. See this paper, supra, note 20.
See, T. Prosser, Law and Regulators, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1997, P 5.
The rules here mean the rule of cost and price. Every kind of market without subjection to liberalisation will have its own cost/price structure that forms an intrinsic force. The liberalisation process aims to substitute a new structure for the old one.
According to the experience of telecommunications liberalisation in New Zealand, at the outset they primarily rely on general competition law to deal with competition problems. Soon after, they found that the workload is so heavy that competition authority has not time to deal with all the problems. Therefore, they cannot help but have recourse to regulatory authority.
Recital 27, Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 7 March 2002 on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services (Framework Directive), OJ 24.4.2002, L 108/33.
Towards a Dynamic European Economy – Green Paper on the development of the common market for telecommunications services and equipment, COM (87) 290 final.
See, Pierre Larouche, Competition law and Regulation in European Telecommunications, Hart Publishing, 2000, P. 3-36.
Directive 2002/21/EC, Framework Directive, recital 1.
Directive 2002/21/EC, Framework Directive, Article 3.
Commission Directive 2002/77/EC on competition in the markets for electronic communications network and service, 2002, O.J. L249/21, (Liberalisation Directive), Article 2.
Directive 2002/21/EC, Framework Directive, Article 14-16.
Directive 2002/19/EC, Access Directive.
Directive 2002/20/EC, Authorisation Directive.
Directive 2002/21/EC, Framework Directive, Article 13.
Directive 2002/22/EC, Universal Service Obligations Directive.
Directive 2002/21/EC, Framework Directive, Article 17-19.
Directive 2002/21/EC, Framework Directive, Article 21-25.
Directive 2002/21/EC, Framework Directive, Article 8.
See, Alexandre de Streel, The Integration of Competition Law Principle in the New European Regulatory Framework for Electronic Communication, World Competition, 26(3): 489-514, 2003.
This project will focus only on the first sub-category of economic regulation.
See, ERG Common Position on the approach to appropriate remedies in the new regulatory framework, ERG (03) 30Rev1, P.24.
Directive 2002/21/EC, Framework Directive, Article 16.
COMMISSION RECOMMENDATION on Relevant Product and Service Markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communication networks and services, (Text with EEA relevance).
Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, 11.7.2002, O.J. C 165/03.
Commission Recommendation of February 11, 2003 on relevant product and service markets within the electronic communications sector susceptible to ex ante regulation in accordance with Directive 2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services O.J. L114/45.
Supra, note 55, p 7.
Supra, 55, P. 7.
Para 27, Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ 11.7.2002, C 165/03.
See one of contributions on the convergence, supra, note 48.
Para 27, Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ 11.7.2002, C 165/03.
Recital 27, Framework Directive.
Para 61, Commission guidelines on market analysis and the assessment of significant market power under the Community regulatory framework for electronic communications networks and services, OJ 11.7.2002, C 165/03.
Supra, note 22.
Article 14 of the framework Directive.
Supra, note 62, Para 75.
See, Damien Geradin, Paul Hofer, Frederic Louis, Nicolas Petit and Mike Walker, The Concept of Dominance in EC Competition Law, July 2005, http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=770144.
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