otherwise, one would merely put his life, together with the security and welfare of his family, in jeopardy.Before the state, then, even a gentleman could not maintain his dignity because he was compelled to refrain his action and speech out of fear for an omnipotent power.This is incompatible with the earlier image that, as a mature, just and courageous man, he should be without any fear for actions (including public speeches) he thinks to be just and proper.As a rational being, it seems, he would desire to live in a better social arrangement in which his moral autonomy can be effectively preserved.Indeed, a central theme that continues to preoccupy the contemporary neo-Confucianism has been to extend from “sageliness within” (Nei Sheng) to “kingliness without” (Wai Wang)--a political system that is conducive to the realization of endowed virtues and, thus, the enhancement of human dignity.
Therefore, to consistently follow the Principle of the Mean, it seems necessary for a Confucian gentleman to adopt some institutional mechanism to guarantee his basic right in order to minimize the possibility that his dignity is degraded.Nor should a gentleman feel shame in exercising and defending his rights in democratic politics, as the partisan competitions can now be carried out through entirely peaceful and dignified constitutional procedures, without having to “wrangle”.Quite the contrary, in the spirit of the Mean, the secure independence of a gentleman requires a certain balance of power between an individual and the state, in order that nobody is so overwhelmed by the omnipotent power of the sovereign as to become the mere object of political control.When this independence is endangered by the natural disparity of power between the state and individuals, the Principle of Mean demands the implementation of a system of rights, so that the power of the stronger can be checked peacefully, and the balance restored, secured and enforced by an effective legal artifice.Such a balance can be guaranteed by a rationally designed Constitution based upon a set of fundamental values, which are shared by a people who have commonly agreed to respect the dignity of every member in society.
It may be contended, at last, that such a universalistic notion of respect could not be consistently derived from Confucianism, an ethics primarily concerned with particularistic duties.The Confucian concept of general love (Ai or Fan Ai), for example, is not to be confused with the Mohist notion of undifferentiated, universal love.Rather the Confucian love was graded according to the proximity of natural human relationships, enforced by a hierarchical system of propriety (Li), which prescribed different rules for treating one’s family members, friends and members of society.And the Confucian notion of “intimate love” (Qin) is further restricted, by definition, to be within one’s family.I argue, however, that the clear distinction between particularistic love and general respect constitute the strength rather than weakness of Confucianism.This is best seen in the context of the central concept of humanity (Ren), which the Confucianists define as a radiating process beginning naturally from within one’s family and extending to more remote social relationships.
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