In summary, Principle V and VI are deemed to confirm the unrestricted right to remote sensing without prior consent or notification. Additionally, remote-sensing States are required to enter into consultations with sensed States upon request. In this sense, Principle XIII is attributed much more in return for technical discrepancy situations. Furthermore, States conducting remote sensing are required to provide technical assistance on mutually agreed terms and are encouraged, preferably through regional agreements, to establish data collection, storage, processing and interpretation facilities, by Principle VII(22) . The reason for these provisions is evident inasmuch as the application of the relevant principles in such case is made dependent on “mutually acceptable terms”. Concretely, such made available “technical assistance” should also apply the previous two principles, as stipulating the needs of developing countries and “whenever feasible” is at hands. Moreover, in return, the state subject to remote sensing has access to the data on a non-discriminatory basis and at a reasonable price. Those states conducting remote sensing activities must make available to all States, at their request and to the greatest extent feasible and practicable, any relevant non-discriminatory access and it was part of the U.S. “Open Skies” policy to begin with and codified by Principle XII(23) . This includes access to available analyzed information in the possession of any State participating in remote sensing on the same basis and terms, and most significantly, sensed States shall have access to primary and processed data concerning the territory under their jurisdiction as soon as it is produced on a nondiscriminatory basis and on reasonable cost terms. Nevertheless, this could not be viewed as a victory when it comes to furthering the development of lesser developed countries in that they should have immediate access to state of the art data and information on reasonable terms, provided the guarantee that they have the means to pay for it.
　　Problems remain, certainly. How will the sensed State know the data or information has been produced? What is the real meaning of information regarding such activities? Furthermore, apart from the contractual transmission, is there isocracy in remote sensing legal framework, especially in the case of technical assistance, whereas it is not pure assistance but the assisted states conduct partial arm’s length deals, inter alia, binding the demanded access to data? Last but not the least, apart from the method of covenant encouraged, even a little bit broadly interpreting, from the angle of a third party state, are the acquirement and the dissemination of remote sensing data needing the prior approval of operator state or sensed state, or is it ad libitum on sovereignty? Such problems have kept Gordian knots in the circumstances of great technical, economic and political discrepancy amongst the countries. Not only the sensed states emphasized sovereignty in remote sensing activities, but also the sensor states highlighted it on verification issue. Data is treasure, and before ideally contributed to and shared by the world, must be proprietary by some subjects, whether there is any agreement or not. To resolve such communicative problem, in 1978, a proposal to create an International Satellite Control Agency was tabled by France during the first session of the Disarmament Conference of the United Nations held in New York. This proposal again came up for debate at the Second Disarmament Conference in 1982. The main motivation behind the proposal was inspired by military considerations.(24)　

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