流域水污染控制的市场机制研究-法搜-中国法律信息搜索网

科斯机制和庇古机制不仅指导思想不同，它们还各有优缺点。本文的第五章是对科斯机制和庇古机制的比较分析。该章首先对科斯机制和庇古机制各自的优劣进行了分析，并在此基础上对二者进行了比较分析。本文认为，科斯机制能有效避免“政府失灵”的出现，节约行政管理成本并更具有公平性；但要受交易成本，财产权结构和市场发育程度的制约。庇古机制适应面广，易于推行，但受到信息不对称和政府失灵的困扰。但二者之间很难说孰优孰劣，我们不需要以一种机制的优点去否定另一机制，也不需要因为一种手段有缺陷就否定其存在的价值。我们所要做的是，在不同的情况下选择不同的环境经济手段。在环境效果与经济收益相同的前提下，在政府的管理成本低而市场的交易成本高的情况下往往适合庇古机制，而在政府的管理成本高而市场的交易成本低时往往适合于科斯机制，在政府失灵较严重时，要选用科斯机制，而在市场失灵较严重时，宜选用庇古机制。
最后是本文的结语部分。

【关键词】污染；市场机制；制度；科斯机制；庇古机制；财产权；水权；排污权；外部性
【全文】
　　流域水污染控制的市场机制研究
　　Abstract
　　The phenomenon that water pollution is becoming more and more serious has became an important environment problem hindering Chinese development. How to control water pollution efficiently is an issue that government and society have explored hard. Chinese current water-pollution control mechanism is direct-control mechanism. Notwithstanding this mechanism is important and effective, it is criticized because of its low efficiency. Reforming this command-control mechanism becomes more and more pressing. One of ways is that market mechanism is led in through institutional reform. This is the problem that this thesis tries to solve.
　　Chapter I of the thesis shows its methodology__institution analysis. This analysis contains two kinds of ways which are connected closely but different. One is treating institution as independent variable to analyze the influence of institution on human action and society. This is so-called institution-effect theory. Another is treating institution as dependent variable to analyze ways and impetuses of its development. It’s so-called institution-change theory. That institution is very important and normalizes human varied action lies in not only its enforceable mechanism, but also its inner information function and incentive function. Institution can reduce of uncertainty to compensate human limited rationality through fixing social consensus and general understanding. And it can supply incentives that lead individual efforts into social activities that are close to rate of individual benefit and rate of social benefit through arranging and protecting property right. But institution in any society is not static. The existence of “external profits” motivates people to reform the untimely institution. Enforceable change is an important way of institution development and country is the most powerful prompter. The object that author has run after longtimely is trying to lead new institution economics into analysis of law. And the thesis is one of attempts.