The shortcomings of standard-setting in the command and control regulatory system are obviously. First of all, they create no incentives for firms to control discharges or to develop cheaper modes of abatement where the standard is already being met. Secondly, they depend on individual bargaining between the agency and polluters, and thus are vulnerable to manipulation by private interests. Thirdly, the uniform standards are less costly to formulate and administer.
　There is an increasing tendency for standards to be set centrally and a further tendency for them to be set out more explicitly in legislative instruments or formal policy documents. For example, in 1996, the creation of the Environmental Agency brought the main pollution control functions (integrated pollution control, waste management and the regulation of water pollution) under one administrative body for the first time. Furthermore, EC standards are imposed through directives, thus effectively replacing local discretion with central prescription.
　　　
　　(c) Enforcement
　　In the command and control regulatory system, failure to comply may lead to the imposition of penal sanctions, if only as a last resort. There are significant numbers of breaches of environmental legislation, but the proportion of prosecutions or other enforcement action is very low. This are some figures for different environmental enforcement agencies including local authority (e.g. only 16 authorities have brought prosecutions for local authority air pollution control (LAAPC) offences in eight years and Clean Air Act 1993 prosecutions form less than 1 percent of the total number of statutory breaches); the Environmental Agency (e.g. the, 270 prosecutions compared with 18,763 pollution incidents in the water sector and 17 prosecutions compared with 825 pollution incidents from IPC progresses) and English Nature (e.g. 15 cases of ‘formal enforcement’ in 1997 with 1 prosecution).　Why was the power to prosecution used so sparingly?　
　　First of all, a wide discretion can be seen at the enforcement stage. There are few statutes which lay down duties to enforce the legislation, or which set out statutory factors to take into account, and usually the decision whether to take action is taken by the regulatory body on the basis of practical and political factors which are not mentioned in the legislation. Secondly, the main styles of enforcement employed by the regulatory bodies include compliance, deterrence, and responsive regulation. The compliance approach is typically characterised the development of flexible relationship between the regulator and the regulated. The amount of discretion given using enforcement powers means that enforce means that enforcement officers can use the informal problem solving rather than being forced to resort to formal sanctions such as prosecution. Thirdly, in most cases environmental enforcement powers operate upon the basis of strict liability, which means that there is no need to prove any negligence or fault on the part of the defendant. Fourthly, the level of criminal penalties used in sentencing for environmental crimes is doubted. The level of fines has traditionally been so low that it is not seen as an effective sanction compared with the profit that was generated from the environmental harmful activities. Lastly, the personnel and funding play an important role, the regulatory agencies need enough resources to pay for the inspection and enforcement.　

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