Moral rights
It is worth noting that the 1994 Act introduced a new section headed “moral rights”.[67] This was the first time that moral rights were clearly separated from economic copyright in this way in New Zealand. The 1994 Act contains the following moral rights: the right to be identified as the author of a work or director of a film; the right to object to derogatory treatment of a work or film; the right against false attribution and the right to privacy of certain photographs and films.
In terms of the right to be identified as the author of a work or director of a film, as far as a celebrity is concerned, it seems that this right adds little to the interest of a real character. For example, the right may be infringed by reproducing the visual image of a character but this would normally be an infringement of the artistic copyright anyway.[68] One thing worthy of mention is transmission of moral rights on death. When the author dies, the moral right to attribution (as well as the right to object to derogatory treatment) passes to a person named in the author’s will or, if there is no will or no provision in a will about moral rights, the right passes with the copyright. [69] Obviously, those provisions will be of benefit to character merchandising after the death of the author.
As to the right to object to derogatory treatment of a work or film, subject to sec 98(1) of the 1994 Act, the term “treatment” of a work includes any addition to, deletion from, alteration to, or adaptation of the work; and the treatment of a work is derogatory if, whether by distortion or mutilation of the work or otherwise, the treatment is prejudicial to the honour or reputation of the author or director. As mentioned above, character merchandising is of big economic value, honour or reputation is very important in terms of marketing and exploiting a character. The provision of this right protects the unity of the work, and then greatly meets the need of the merchandising of the characters.
As regards the right against false attribution, this may be the most important moral right for the copyright protection of characters. Unlike the right to authorship and against derogatory treatment, any person may exercise the right against false attribution. So it has been argued that this right is not a moral right of copyright owners, but rather a statutory recognition of a potential common law defamation action.[70] Thus if an author took a character originated by another and composed a work constructed around that character he might by doing so impliedly represent that the work was by that other. This could be so even if he published it under his own name. [71] A case in point is Clark v. Associated Newspapers Ltd.[72] In this case, the plaintiff was a Member of Parliament and an author with an established reputation. His best-known publication was the Diaries, which contained extracts from his diaries kept until his temporary retirement from politics in 1992. The Diaries were very successful and controversial. After failing to get consent, the defendant published a weekly column in the form of a spoof diary written by Peter Bradshaw entitled “Alan Clark’s Secret Political Diaries” which parodied the style of the plaintiff’s Diaries. Finding in favor of the plaintiff, Lightman J. stated that it was important to make clear that this judgment was no bar to publication of parodies. Where the line was to be drawn between what did and what did not constitute false attribution of authorship was a question of judgment, and often a difficult question on which minds might differ. The defendant could, however, continue to publish parodies of the plaintiff and it was made sufficiently clear that Mr. Bradshaw, and not the plaintiff, was the author. No doubt, a celebrity may rely on this right to object to the false attribution or false representation of authorship. In this sense, this right is a quite useful means in copyright protection of character merchandising. However, the right is used in a defensive way and cannot be used positively to protect any form of merchandising activity.[73] In addition, a parody may itself be protected by virtue of the fact that it is a creative adaptation of the parodied work.[74]
The right to privacy of certain photographs and films applies where a person commissions a photograph or film for private or domestic purposes. It is not truly a moral right. Instead, it is as its title suggests, more of a privacy right.[75] A recent Canadian case, to some extent, illustrated the current development in this area. In Aubry v. Editions Vice-Versa,[76] a photograph of a 17-year-old girl (Ms Aubry) was published in Editions Vice-Versa, a magazine, without consent. Ms Aubry sued the photographer and Editions Vice-Versa claiming that the unauthorized publication of her photograph violated her right to privacy guaranteed by sec 5 of the Quebec Charter. Finding in favor of Ms Aubry, the Court pointed out that persons engaged in public activities that have certain notoriety, such as politicians, couldn’t complain if their photograph is published without their consent. That is, the person cannot object to the publication of a photograph if he or she is not the principal subject. Clearly, celebrities certainly have a degree of notoriety and always are the principal subject in public activities. The problem is whether the status of celebrities as public figures will result in a loss of their privacy. Although the right of privacy applies equally to public and private figures at least in theory, in practice celebrities as public figures tend to have a much harder time recovering for an invasion of privacy than do private individuals.[77] It has been argued that this moral right might seem somewhat superfluous in New Zealand because of sec 21 (1) of the 1994 Act. [78] In practice, it seems not necessary for an individual, let alone celebrities, to employ this moral right to protect their privacy. In this sense, celebrities might obtain little interest from this moral right. Perhaps the Quebec law, which confirmed the right to one’s image based on the right of respect of one’s private life, should be given some consideration by New Zealand as a model for legislative reform.
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