Our Ministers of the Crown in New Zealand shall keep Our Governor-General fully informed concerning the general conduct of the Government of Our said Realm, so far as they are responsible therefor, and shall furnish Our Governor-General with such information as he may request with respect to any particular matter relating to the Government of Our said Realm.[58]
　　Of course, situations in which the Governor-General may be called on to exercise the reserve powers are relatively complex and the issues hard to resolve. Accordingly, in order to preserve the office’s neutrality, the Governor-General should act on the basis of information provided by the parliamentary actors, and in exerting of the personal influence avoid making personal judgment as far as possible.
　　
　　Conclusion
　　The reserve powers are certain legal powers of the sovereign or the Governor-General as representative, which can be exercised to protect the constitutional order in extraordinary circumstances. Due to the nature of the reserve powers, in the New Zealand context, the situations in which the reserve powers might be exercised are extremely rare. Under MMP, it seemed possible that governments would frequently be formed, so the Governor-General would play a more active role. But it is incorrect to overstate this case. The essence of the new situation produced by MMP is that the government will be formed through a process of inter-party negotiation and Parliament becomes a more powerful place in making political decision. During this period, the Governor-General’s task is to assert where the support of Parliament lies. If that were unclear, the Governor-General would be dependent on the political parties represented in Parliament to clarify that support, through political discussion and accommodation.[59]
　　 Thus, to some extent, MMP virtually eliminates the possibility of the use of the reserve powers. However, the Governor-General still has a role to play through personal influence, rather than by using the reserve powers. After all, a wise use of influence will obviate the need for use of the reserve powers.[60] In practice, the Governor-General’s influence would depend upon his or her assiduity in studying and understanding government policy, and to greater extent depend upon performance of the community function. In this sense, it seems that the community function has become perhaps the most important role of the Governor-General.
　　
【注释】 Constitution Act 1986, s 2.
Jonathan Boston and others (eds). Electoral and Constitutional Change in New Zealand: An MMP Source Book. Palmerston North: The Dunmore Press, 1999. Page 411.
Andrew Stockley. “The Governor-General and MMP”. New Zealand Law Journal, June 1996, page 213.
Chen. “Remedying New Zealand’s Constitution in Crisis: Is MMP Part of the Answer?” NZLJ 22, page 32-33, 35.
The Role of the Governor-General of New Zealand. Wellington: Government House, 2001. Page 5.
Andrew Stockley, supra n 3 at 213.
Dame Catherine Tizard. Crown and Anchor: the Present Role of the Governor-General in New Zealand. Public address. Wellington, 26 June 1993. Page 4.
S/R 1983/225.
Andrew Ladley. “The Head of State: the Crown, the Queen and the Governor-General.” in Raymond Miller (ed.).New Zealand Politics in Transition, Auckland: Oxford University Press, 1997. Page 56.
Philip A. Joseph, Constitutional and Administrative Law in New Zealand (Second Edition. Wellington: Brookers Ltd. 2001. Page 238.
Dame Catherine Tizard, supra n 7 at 7.
Constitution Act 1986, sec 16.
Richard Mulgan. Politics In New Zealand.Second Edition. Auckland University Press, 1997. Page 54.
Vernon Bogdanor, The Monarchy and the Constitution. Clarendon Press: Oxford, 1995. Page 30.
Ibid.
Ibid at 61-62.
Ibid at 62.
D. Blundell. “Some Reflections upon the office of Governor-General in New Zealand”. 10 VUW Law Review, 1980, page 198.
In this part, we do not want to discuss the reserve powers in detail. For reference on this topic see: Philip A. Joseph, supra n 10. Chapter 18 “Reserve Powers of the Crown”; R.Q.Quentin-Baxter. “The Governor-General’s constitutional discretions: an essay towards a re-definition” (VUWLR (1980) 10 at 289-315); Caroline Morris. “The Governor-General, the reserve powers, Parliament and MMP: A new era” (VUWLR (1995) 25 at 345-372).
F M Brookfield. “The Monarchy and the Constitution today: a New Zealand perspective”. New Zealand Law Journal, December 1992. Page 441.
Mitchell v Director of Public Prosecutions LRC (Const) 35.
Philip A. Joseph, supra n 10 at 683.
Letters Patent 1983, clause II.
F M Brookfield, supra n 20 at 443.
http://whitlamdismissal.com/documents/letter-from-queen.shtml
Andrew Ladley, supra n 9 at 54-55.
F M Brookfield, supra n 20 at 443.
Andrew Ladley, supra n 9 at 57.
Ibid.
Sir Michael Hardie Boys. “Continuity and Change: the 1996 General Election and the Role of the Governor-General”. Waikato Law Review. Vol. 5. 1997.Page 9.
John McGrath QC. “The Crown, the Parliament and the Government”. Waikato Law Review. Vol. 7, 1999. Page 13.
As far as I know, the one occasion of a refusal to assent is, in 1878, the Governor did decline to accept the Premier’s advice to refuse assent to a Bill quoting from http://80-www.butterworthsonline.com.ezproxy.massey.ac.nz/ (Butterworths Publications/Research/Laws of New Zealand/The Laws of New Zealand/The Laws of New Zealand/PARLIAMENT /(1) INTRODUCTION /4. Powers of the Crown.)
Andrew Stockley, supra n 3 at 215.
Ibid at 214. Interestingly, similar opinion was expressed by Queen Victoria in 1846. She said that the sovereign’s power of dissolution had become a weapon “which ought not to be used except in extreme cases and with a certainty of success. To use this instrument and be defeated is a thing most lowering to the Crown and hurtful to the county.”(Letters of Queen Victoria, 1st ser., ii, 108 quoting from Vernon Bogdanor, supra n 14 at 17.)
Dame Catherine Tizard, supra n 7 at 9.
Sir Michael Hardie Boys, supra n 30 at 9-10
Vernon Bogdanor, supra n 14 at 69.
Walter Bagehot. The English Constitution, in Collected Works, ed. Norman St John-Stevas (The Economist, 1974), V. 253 quoting from Vernon Bogdanor, supra n 14 at 69-70.
Philip A. Joseph, supra n 10 at 662.
Ibid, at 661.
P J Downey. “A Constitutional Monarchy”. New Zealand Law Journal, January 1986. Page 1.
Philip A. Joseph, supra n 10 at 236.
Richard Mulgan, supra n 13 at 69-70.
Philip A. Joseph, supra n 10 at 168.
Ibid, at 169.
Ibid at 66.
Ibid at 70.
Alison Quentin-Baxter. “Implication for the Governor-General” in Alan Simpson (ed.) Constitutional Implications of MMP. Victoria University of Wellington. 1998. Page 97.
Andrew Ladley, supra n 9 at 55.
Jonathan Boston and others, New Zealand under MMP: A New Politics? Auckland University Press: 1996. Page 106.
Andrew Stockley, supra n 3 at 217.
The issue became more serious and complex at the beginning of this year when Dr. Hollingworth has been criticized for mishandling sex-abuse allegations while he was Anglican Archbishop of Brisbane.
Andrew Stockley, supra n 3 at 217.
See Richard E McGarvie. “The Work and Selection of a Governor: By Election, Parliament or Premier”. UNSW Law Journal. Vol. 20(1), 1997. Page 140-141.
Andrew Stockley, supra n 3 at 217.
Philip A. Joseph, supra n 10 at 695.
Vernon Bogdanor, supra n 14 at 35.
Clause XVI. However, New Zealand had not had a good record in the past. Sir John Marshall, one of the longest serving ministers in the history of New Zealand, made the following statements in 1977:

The Prime Minister does not report regularly to the Governor-General as the British Prime Minister reports to the Queen. In 20 years as a Minister, I seldom attended at Government House for consultation, even less for encouragement and never to for warning. Even when I was Prime Minister, the consultations with the Governor-General were infrequent, although our relationship, socially and on state occasions, was cordial. (Geoffrey Palmer. Unbridled Power: An Interpretation of New Zealand’s Constitution & Government. Second Edition. Oxford University Press. 1987. Page 28.)

Sir Michael Hardie Boys, supra n 30 at 10.
] Vernon Bogdanor, supra n 14 at 66.

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